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Abstract 
The study was aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance attributes on the financial performance of 
MFIs. Explanatory research design with mixed research approach was employed to carry out the study. From 12 
legally registered microfinance institutions at NBE and operating in Addis Ababa city administration, 7 MFIs 
was purposively selected to investigate the effect of corporate governance variables such as board size, board 
educational qualification, board experience in the financial sector, meeting frequency of the board, board audit 
committee size and board independency on the financial performance of MFIs measured by Return on Equity 
and Operational Self Sufficiency. In addition to main explanatory variables, control variables such as MFIs size, 
leverage and MFIs age were also included in the study variables. Both primary and secondary data were used in 
which primary data regarding board characteristics was collected through questionnaire and secondary data was 
obtained from NBE and AEMFI. Panel data covering six year from 2010-2015 was analyzed for seven 
microfinance institutions. The regression results revealed that board size, board educational qualification, 
meeting frequency, board independency and MFIs age have positive and significant relationship with financial 
performance; whereas board experience in the financial sector and board audit committee size has statistically 
negative association with MFIs’ financial performance. Leverage and the size of microfinance institutions do not 
have significant impact on the financial performance of Microfinance Institutions. Based on empirical result of 
the study, it is recommended that board audit committee sizes should be kept low. Furthermore, in order to 
reduce the problem of management failures which put at risk the money obtained from government and other 
sources, the governance system of MFIs have to be effective. 
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Introduction 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004), corporate governance is set 
of rules that define the relationship between stakeholders, management, and board of directors of a company and 
influence how that company is operating. It can be also defined as the process carried out by the board of 
directors, and its related committees, on behalf of and for the benefit of the company's Shareholders and the 
other Stakeholders to provide direction, authority, and oversights to the management. According to Waseem et 
al.(2011), corporate governance is basically concerned with ways in which all parties interested in the well-being 
of the firm (the stakeholders) attempt to ensure that managers and other insiders are always taking appropriate 
measures or adopt mechanisms that safeguard the interests of the stakeholders. According to Tarek (2007), good 
corporate governance ensures that the business environment is fair and transparent and that companies can be 
held accountable for their actions. Conversely, weak corporate governance leads to waste, mismanagement, and 
corruption. Regardless of the type of venture, only good governance can deliver sustainable good business 
performance. In corporate governance, the role played by each member can play a pivotal role for the 
achievement of goal and objectives of the firm. It is high time that corporate governance took a wider 
perspective; a perspective that does not focused on shareholders wealth maximization only but considering all 
other stakeholders (Oladipupo et al., 2014). 
In Ethiopia there are various microfinance institutions which operate in different parts of the country. 
According to Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions (2016), currently there are 35 member of MFIs 
providing microfinance activities in the area of credit delivery, saving, money transfer,  and pension payment 
services in 8 of 11 regional states/ administrative organs of the EFDRE. According to Belete (2015), Ethiopia is 
a country that has been showing impressive performance in microfinance in Africa. In the past the firm 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)  
Vol.10, No.21, 2019 
 
20 
performance is assumed to be determined by many factors. But, nowadays the concept of corporate governance 
becomes the most important discussion in both developed and developing countries. Various corporate 
governance variables have been measured to assess their effect on financial performance of the firm.  
The motives behind this research were: First, there is no sufficient literature relating to the effect of 
corporate governance attributes on financial performance of MFIs. The review also reveals that there is scarcity 
of researches that examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and operational 
sustainability of MFIs that is measured by operational self-sufficiency in Ethiopia. Therefore, a strong 
motivation to investigate empirically, the effect of these attributes on the financial performance of MFIs was the 
main motivation of the study. Second, the study on the effect of corporate governance variables on financial 
performance of the firm is also rare in Ethiopia. Hence, a comprehensive study that considers the scarcity of the 
study is needed to improve lack of research on the issue in Ethiopia that can broaden the literature regarding the 
concept of corporate governance mechanism and its effect. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
According to Kingsley & Theophilus (2012), corporate governance has become a topical issue because of its 
immense contribution to the economic growth and development of the nation. The absence of good corporate 
governance is a major cause of failure for many well performing companies on their operation; because good 
corporate governance needs the dedication of parties in the governance system for co-operation and transparency 
towards the achievement of goals and objectives. This implies that, the absence of teamwork and accountability 
leads to ineffective and creates doubts between the governing body and the owners so that the financial 
performance of the firm can be affected. Thrikawala (2013) argued that MFIs which maintain good corporate 
governance practices will be financially and socially sustainable and reduce risk.  
Microfinance industry has vigorous focus on loan to the poor and motivated to extend the frontier of 
financial intermediation to those excluded from financial market. Therefore, microfinance’s governance subjects 
are not only indispensable but also an essential variable in the bid to uphold the wellbeing of the poor because of 
their increasing role in controlling significant resources. Many studies introduced the effect of corporate 
governance on the financial performance and established the relationship between corporate governance 
variables and profitability by using indicator of financial performance such as ROE and OSS especially in 
developed countries. However, in developing countries like Ethiopia the issue was not well developed and well-
studied to reveal the influence of corporate governance on the financial performance of the firm. 
The Ethiopian microfinance sector is characterized by its rapid growth, an aggressive drive to achieve 
economies of scale, a broad geographic coverage, a dominance of government backed MFIs, an emphasis on 
rural households, the promotion of both credit and savings products, a strong focus on sustainability and by the 
fact that the sector is Ethiopian owned and driven (Ebisa et al., 2013).  Studies that have been conducted on the 
impact of corporate governance on the financial performance of the firm are less in Ethiopia. For instance, 
Yenesew (2012) studied about the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on banks’ financial performance 
in Ethiopia. Moreover, a few studies were conducted in Ethiopia on the effect of corporate governance on the 
financial performance of microfinance institutions (Wolday, 2008; Belete, 2015; & Eyob, 2016). They took 
corporate governance variables such as board size, board gender composition, board competence, and board 
experience in the financial sector, meeting frequency, size of the audit committee, CEO duality and CEO gender 
as variables which affect the financial performance of microfinance institutions measured by ROA and ROE.  
Those studies suggested for the future research that the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firms’ financial performance can also be further explained if future researches conduct study 
including more corporate governance variables and by adding period of research study. Moreover, previous 
studies made on this subject area were carried out at country level. However, there were no previous studies that 
examined the effect of corporate governance on financial performance of MFIs at regional level or city 
administrative level in Ethiopia. On the other hand, there was no previous study that examined the effect of 
corporate governance mechanism on financial performance of MFIs measured by OSS in Ethiopia. The concept 
of corporate governance needs great attention because of its indispensable role in determining the firm 
performance. Therefore, examining the issue deeply going down from countrywide to region wide/City 
administration level can broaden the understanding of the effect of corporate governance variables on financial 
performance of MFIs. In order to fill this gap, the current researcher was acknowledged these suggestions and 
put in one unique financial performance measurement technique (i.e. OSS) that measures the operational 
sustainability of MFIs to evaluate corporate governance effect on the financial performance of MFIs operating in 
Addis Ababa city administration.  
 
Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to examine the effect of corporate governance attributes on the financial 
performance of microfinance institutions operating in Addis Ababa City Administration.          
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Results and Discussion 
4.4. Correlation Analysis 
Pairwise correlations analysis is a technique of assessing the relationship among variables selected for the study. 
The dependent variables that were selected for this study were Return on Equity (ROE) and Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS); and the independent variables were board size, board educational qualification, board 
experience in the financial sector, meeting frequency of the board, board audit committee size, and size of 
outside directors that was expected to influence effect variables. The results of the correlation matrix that reveals 
the degree of association among study variables at different level significance (i.e. 1%, 5% and 10%) are 
depicted in the table 4.6 and table 4.7 below. 
4.4.1. Correlation Analysis of ROE and Board Characteristics Elements 
Correlation matrix below indicates that board size, board educational qualification, meeting frequency, outside 
directors, board independency and control variables such as MFIs age has a positive correlation with ROE. On 
the other hand, board audit committee size and board experience in the financial sector has negative association 
with financial performance. Finally, a control variable such as MFIs’ age has also positive and significant 
correlation with ROE.  
Table 4.6: Correlation Analysis of ROE and Board Characteristics 
Correlation   ROE              BS            BOEDU         BEFS              MF          ACS          BIND           LNTA          
LEV      MFIs age 
ROE          1.000000 
BS             0.001559      1.000000 
BOEDU    0.136452      0.195697     1.000000 
BEFS        -0.218308     0.705976*     0.522345*     1.000000 
MF            0.321084*    -0.368930*     0.297740*   -0.182348    1.000000 
ACS         -0.106189    -0.315917*    0.182583        0.175181   -0.073734    1.000000 
BIND        0.304255*    -0.247055   -0.019389       -0.245474    0.267670*   -0.226723   1.000000 
LNTA      -0.001659     0.288506*     0.220002       0.290375*    0.183392   -0.221435   0.373335*   1.000000 
LEV         -0.401880*    -0.298222*    0.248602     -0.421676*    0.498344* -0.075716    0.212742     0.086415    
1.000000 
MFIs aga   0.550897    -0.110715    -0.045448       -0.300484     0.066972    0.060393   0.127306    -0.053260    
0.409004
*  1.000000 
Source:  Author survey data, 2017 STATA output  
Note: 1. Bold indicates, significant at 1% level of significance. 
           2. Italic indicates, significant at 5% level of significance. 
           3. A star indicates, significant at 10% level of significance. 
4.4.2. Correlation Analysis of OSS and Board Characteristics Elements 
The second model is regarding financial sustainability of microfinance institutions measured by Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS). Microfinance institutions can be attained sustainability when their operating income from 
loan is sufficient to cover all the operating costs. The institutional sustainability of MFIs can be measured by 
operational self-sufficiency. Therefore, operational self-sufficiency measures operating revenues as a percentage 
of operating and financial expenses including loan loss provision expense. In this case explained variable is OSS 
and explanatory variables are board size, board educational qualification, and board experience in the financial 
sector, meeting frequency of the board, board audit committee size and outside directors were expected to 
influence the institutional sustainability of MFIs. The control variables included in this model were MFIs’ 
leverage and MFIs age.  
The correlation matrix in the table 4.7 below indicates that board size, educational qualification of the board, 
outside director, meeting frequency of the board and MFIs age have a positive correlation with OSS. This 
implies the large number of board of directors, educational qualification of the board, outside directors and 
frequency of board meeting can improve the operational sustainability of MFIs. Control variables (i.e. MFIs age) 
have significant positive association with OSS. This implies the age of MFIs can improve the operational 
sustainability of MFIs. On the other hand, sizes of board audit committee, board experience in the financial 
sector and Leverage have negative correlation with the OSS. This indicates that board audit committee size, 
board experience in the financial sector and leverage has negatively contributed to the financial performance of 
MFIs. 
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 Table 4.7: Correlation Analysis of OSS and Board Characteristics 
Correlation OSS BS BOEDU BEFS MF ACS BIND LEV MFISAGE 
OSS  1.000000 
BS  0.260698*  1.000000 
BOEDU  0.106624  0.195697  1.000000 
BEFS -0.168786  0.705976*  0.522345*  1.000000 
MF  0.123388 -0.368930*  0.297740* -0.182348  1.000000 
ACS -0.585230* -0.315917*  0.182583  0.175181 -0.073734  1.000000    
BIND  0.232889 -0.247055 -0.019389 -0.245474  0.267670* -0.226723  1.000000   
LEV    -0.251698 -0.298222*  0.248602 -0.421676*  0.498344* -0.075716  0.212742  1.000000  
MFISAGE  0.356812* -0.110715 -0.045448 -0.300484*  0.066972  0.060393  0.127306  0.409004*  1.000000 
Source: Author survey data, 2017 STATA output 
Note: 1. Bold indicates, significant at 1% level of significance. 
           2. Italic indicates, significant at 5% level of significance. 
           3. A star indicates, significant at 10% level of significance 
 
4.5. Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model 
According to Brooks (2008), there are broadly two classes of panel data estimator approaches that can be 
employed in financial research. These are fixed effect model and random effect model. Fixed effects models 
allow the intercept in the regression model to differ cross-sectionally but not over time, while all of the slope 
estimates are fixed both cross-sectionally and over time. An alternative to the fixed effects model described 
above is the random effects model, which is sometimes also known as the error components model. As with 
fixed effects, the random effects approach proposes different intercept terms for each entity and again these 
intercepts are constant over time, with the relationships between the explanatory and explained variables 
assumed to be the same both cross-sectionally and temporally. 
However, the difference is that under the random effects model, the intercepts for each cross-sectional unit 
are assumed to arise from a common intercept α (which is the same for all cross-sectional units and over time), 
plus a random variable i that varies cross-sectionally but is constant over time. i measures the random deviation 
of each entity’s intercept term from the ‘global’ intercept term α (Brooks, 2008). In order to choose and apply 
the appropriate model, hypothesis was developed and tested by Hausman specification test. The null hypothesis 
is: random effect model is appropriate and alternative hypothesis is: fixed effect model is appropriate. If p-value 
is greater than 5 Percent, null hypothesis should be accepted otherwise alternative hypothesis. Based on 
Hausman specification test for both models, random effect model can be appropriate for the estimation of the 
model since the p-value of both models is greater than 5 Percent (See: Appendix B and C). 
 
4.6. Regression Result of the Study 
Under this section the regression model and the discussion of the result was presented. The panel data for six 
consecutive years of seven MFIs was used to run the regression to investigate the effect of corporate governance 
on the financial performance of MFIs measured by ROE and OSS. Model one in the table 4.8 below is regarding 
the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of MFIs measured by ROE. The 
overall significance of the model can be seen from regression result of Wald chi2 and its p-value result. The 
study found that the model is significant which means that the financial performance of MFIs can be influenced 
by corporate governance mechanism. This conclusion can be supported by the regression result of Wald chi2 and 
its p-value (i.e. Wald chi2 (6) = 42.10; p-value = 0.0000) that reveals the model is significant. Moreover, the 
regression result of random-effects GLS model indicates that the output of multiple panel data regression 
analysis is found at fairly satisfactory level. This can be evidenced by the overall result of R-squared that reveals 
56.81%. This implies that there is a relationship between explained and explanatory variables so that the 
variation in the dependent variable is well explained by the variation in the explanatory variables of the model. 
Accordingly, board size, board educational qualification, board experience in the financial sector meeting 
frequency of the board and MFIs age are statistically significant, whereas, board audit committee size, MFIs size 
and leverage are not statistically significant.  
The second empirical model is regarding operational self sufficiency (OSS) that measures the institutional 
sustainability of MFIs. The overall result of random-effect GLS model reveals that the model adequately 
describes the data. It indicates that the model is significant and well fitted that corporate governance mechanism 
has significant effect on the financial performance of MFIs measured by OSS. This can be evidenced by the 
regression result of the model that indicates   (Wald chi2 (8) = 58.74 with its p-value of 0.0000) so that the 
model is fairly significant in which the explanatory can influence the dependent variable at 5 percent level of 
significant. Moreover, the overall R-square that indicates the overall fitness of the model reveals that 64 percent 
of the variation in OSS was explained by corporate governance and control variables. Since the main objective 
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of the study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance on financial performance of MFIs, board 
characteristics were taken as explanatory variables and MFIs’ financial performance was taken as explained 
variables. Under this section of the chapter the principal implication of the study’s result was discussed.  
Table 4.8: Regression results of model one 
Random-effects GLS regression                                                    Number of obs = 42                                                                                                                 
R-sq:  within = 0.4085                                                                Number of groups = 7                                                  
       Between = 0.9336                                                              Obs per group: min = 6                                                                          
         Overall = 0.5681                                                                                     avg = 6.0  
                                                                                                                           Max = 6                                                                           
                                                                                                Wald chi2 (6) =      42.10         
                                                                                              Prob > chi2    =       0.0000         
 
                                                 Robust 
         roe            Coef.           Std. Err.             z                   P>|z|              [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
             bs         .0659041        .0278725          2.36           0.018              .0112749         .1205333 
       boedu         .3771218        .0809543          4.66           0.000              .2184543         .5357893 
          befs        -.3954427        .1168987        -3.38            0.001            -.6245598       - .1663255 
            mf         .0213662        .0076773         2.78             0.005               .006319         .0364133 
        boacs       -.3974281        .3453371         1.15             0.250            -.2794203         1.074276 
          bind        .4082796        .2655945         1.54           0.0124              -.112276         .9288352 
           lnta       -.1548647        .2126912        -0.73            0.467            -.5717319         .2620024 
            lev       -.0160138        .0182957        -0.88            0.381            -.0518726         .0198451 
  MFIs age        .0209566        .0076094         2.75            0.006              .0060425         .0358707 
        _cons      -1.323096        .4610387        -2.87            0.004             -2.226716        -.4194772 
 
sigma_u                             0 
sigma_e           .09595236 
        rho                          0  (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
Source: Author regression result, 2017 STATA output 
 
Table 4.9: Regression results of model two 
Random-effects GLS regression                                                          Number of obs = 42                                                                                                               
R-sq:  within = 0.0624                                                                      Number of groups = 7                                                      
       Between = 0.9845                                                                    Obs per group: min = 6                                                                               
         Overall = 0.6403                                                                                          avg = 6.0 
                                                                                                                               Max = 6                                                                                 
                                                                                                 Wald chi2 (8)       =    58.74 
                                                                                                  Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
            oss           Coef.                Std. Err.           z          P>|z|        [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
             bs         .1360878         .0540522         2.52       0.012        .0301474      .2420282 
       boedu          1.877747        .6390351        2.94        0.003        .6252609      3.130232 
          befs         -1.18337         .4405914        -2.69       0.007      -2.046914     -.3198271 
            mf         .0158394         .0199492        0.79        0.427      -.0232603      .0549391 
         boacs       -1.426861       .6885219        -2.07        0.038      -2.776339    -.0773825 
          bind         .3615147         .377549         0.96        0.338      -.3784678      1.101497 
            lev        -.0911957        .0629691       -1.45        0.148      -.2146129     .0322215 
   MFIs age        .0451513        .0177971        2.54        0.011       .0102696       .080033 
        _cons         -1.029611      .8030901       -1.28        0.200      -2.603638     .5444171 
 
sigma_u                         0 
sigma_e          .20837857 
        rho                         0      (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Source: Author regression result, 2017 STATA output 
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4.7. Hypothesis Testing 
Under this section the developed empirical hypothesis of the study was tested. The hypothesis was tested based 
on the regression result of Random-effect generalized least squares (GLS), with cluster robust standard error 
using STATA version12. 
H01:  There is no significant relationship between board size and financial performance of MFIs. 
The regression result of the study in the table 4.8 and table 4.9 indicates that there is statistically significant 
(P>|z| = 0.018 < 0.05) and (P>|z| = 0.012< 0.05) positive relationship between board size and MFIs’ financial 
performance measured by ROE and OSS at 5 percent level of significant respectively. This implies that the size 
of board directors has significant positive effect on financial performance of MFIs. Council of Microfinance 
Equity Funds (2012) argued that board should be large enough to complete their work effectively (without 
overburdening members), to provide continuity, and to ensure quorums meeting. Therefore, the result is 
complements with the view that large boards are more effective in monitoring and controlling MFIs management 
and help to reduce the agency cost so that the sustainability and profitability of MFIs can be achieved. The 
empirical result of the study supports the prior empirical finding of different authors that argued increase in 
board size leads to effective monitoring and supervising the activities of management. Accordingly, the result is 
consistent with prior studies which argue that larger boards have their benefits and when board size increases 
firm performance also goes up as more board members provide greater monitoring, advice and make available 
better linkages to the external environment (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003; Daniel et al, 2007; Bassem, 2009; 
Mersland, & Strom, 2009; Lukawago, 2012; Chenous et al., 2014; & Akpan, 2015). Moreover, the finding did 
not support the argument of Fama & Jensen (1983) stating that an increase in board size leads to less effective 
communication and monitoring due to coordination and process problems inherent in large board size. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis is rejected and board size has significant effect on MFIs’ financial performance. 
H02: Board educational qualification has no significant relationship with financial performance of  MFIs. 
Board educational qualification, according to the regression result had statistically significant positive 
association with ROE and OSS (P>|z| =0.000 <0.05) and (P>|z| =0.003<0.05) respectively. The result of the 
multiple random-effect GLS regression of the two models indicate that the high proportion of directors who had 
college degree or higher had a significant positive influence on the financial performance of MFIs. This implies 
that, the educational qualification of the board directors improve the MFIs’ profitability and sustainability since 
the presence of qualified directors on the board plays an indispensable role in performing the boards’ monitoring 
and supervising that in turn improve the financial performance of MFIs. Thrikawala (2013) provided 
recommendation that MFIs’ boards have to be selected on academic and professional quality so that the 
monitoring activities would be carried out efficiently and effectively. 
The result of the study is consistent with prior studies made by different authors. Accordingly, educational 
qualification affects the oversight and monitoring role of boards of directors and this also reduces agency cost as 
well; because directors are required to make an informed decision which requires a thorough understanding 
(Bassem, 2009; Lukwago, 2012; Mori, & Olomi, 2012; & Thrikawala, 2013). Their result indicates that board 
without appropriate educational qualification cannot contribute to the financial performance of MFIs. Moreover, 
the educational qualification of the board plays a significant role at the time of analysis and interpretation of 
information and data which is important for the effective strategic guidance of the operation of MFIs and the 
effective control or monitoring of management by board of directors. Generally, according to the results of the 
study educational qualification of the board of directors as measured by the percentage of directors who had 
college degree or higher significantly influences Microfinance Institutions profitability and sustainability. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and board educational qualification has significant effect on the 
financial performance of MFIs. 
H03: Board’s experience in the financial sector has no significant relationship with the financial            
performance of MFIs.  
Board experience in the financial sector implies the board’s job experience in the financial sectors. The 
regression result regarding board experience in the financial sectors for both ROE and OSS is negative 
(coefficient of -0.3954427 and -1.18337 respectively) that indicate there is a negative relationship between board 
experience with financial sector and MFIs’ financial performance. This implies that board experience in the 
financial sector is statistically not significance relationship with ROE and OSS (P>|z| = 0.001 <0.05 and P>|z| = 
0.007 <0.05 respectively) at 5 percent level of significance.  
The empirical result obtained by this study did not support the prior studies finding that the higher the 
proportions of directors who had earlier working experience in the financial sector the better the financial 
performance of MFIs (Valentina, 2005; Bassem, 2009; & Durgavanshi, 2014). They conclude that, in order to be 
strategic resource of the firm, board need to be skillful. However, the finding of this study was not consistent 
with those findings because the management system is specific to the countries. This means that what is applied 
in most developed countries cannot be applied in developing countries. Regarding corporate governance system 
in developing countries, it was not well developed and the awareness concerning the governance principles 
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under corporate governance was not well understood in developing countries including Ethiopia. As a result, 
board members of most of MFIs in Ethiopia do not have awareness of the concept of corporate governance and 
hence do not apply best practices of corporate governance in their respective MFIs. In addition, the board 
members of government owned MFIs play dual role so that they carry out political issue in addition to 
monitoring the activities of manager.  
Therefore, according to the finding of this study, the mere experience of the board in the financial sector 
cannot contribute to the financial performance of the firm. Moreover, most of the boards are recruited from 
outside that are serve as the board member of different organizations so that they are financially strong. The 
result of the study is consistent with the finding of Xie et al. (2001) found that outside directors with corporate 
background are more likely to be financially sophisticated and their presence is associated with a reduced level 
of earning management. As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected and board experience in the financial sector 
has significant effect on the financial performance of MFIs. 
H04:  There is no significant relationship between meeting frequency of the board and financial performance of 
MFIs. 
The concept of meeting frequency in corporate governance refers to the frequency of time that the boards 
meet in a year. Boards should regularly meet in executive session without management present to discuss matters 
that may be particularly sensitive regarding management (Council of Microfinance Equity Fund, 2012). 
Moreover, for board to effectively perform its oversight function and monitor management performance, the 
board must hold a regular meeting. The result of the regression depicts that meeting frequency is positively 
associated with financial performance of MFIs. According to the study finding, it improves financial 
performance specially ROE with P>|z| = 0.005 which is less than 5 percent and indicates the more board is meet 
frequently the higher financial result of MFIs. In addition, the relationship between board meeting frequency and 
OSS is positive but the effect of meeting frequency is insignificant.  
The finding of this study was in line with prior studies that one of the measure of board effectiveness in 
monitoring the activities of manager can be  indicated by the frequency of meeting they performs (Karamanou & 
Vefeas, 2008; Mangena & Tauringana,2008; & Ntim & Osei, 2011). They conclude that frequent board meetings 
can result in higher qualities of management monitoring that in turn impact positively on corporate financial 
performance. However, the finding of the study contrasted the result of Akpan (2015) that reports a statistical 
significance and negative association between frequency board meetings and corporate performance which 
means that the frequency of meetings reduced shareholders earnings as company incurred more financial 
expenses in terms of sitting allowance, travelling expenses, hotel accommodation and entertainment during 
meetings. As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected and board of directors’ meeting frequency has significant 
effect on the financial performance of MFIs. 
H05: Size of audit committee has no significant effect on the financial performance of MFIs.  
Size of audit committee according to this study is the percentage of the board that was included in the audit 
committee of the MFIs and responsible for oversight of the financial reporting process, selection of the 
independent auditor, and receipt of audit results of both internal and external auditors. The size of audit 
committee is negative insignificant relationship with ROE. However, the finding is not consistent with studies of 
(Bassem, 2009; Lukwago, 2012; & Danoshana, & Ravivathani, 2013). They pointed out that increasing audit 
committee size will result high financial performance; because detailed discussion on the financial statement of 
the companies will lead to get more ideas regarding the reports and it will guide to increase the firm’s 
performance.  
However, there is statistically significant negative relationship between OSS and size of board audit 
committee (P>|z| = 0.038 < 0.05). This implies that as the percentage of board that included in the audit 
committee increases, the operational self sufficiency which measures the operational sustainability of MFIs is 
reduces. It is impossible to conclude that the only presence of audit committee improve their effectiveness in 
performing its oversight role.  This may be due to inefficient of the board member included in the audit 
committee since they serve as dual role (i.e. as board member and as audit committee member) which make 
them ineffective. This result is consistent with Xie et al., (2001) that found the performance of the audit 
committee was determined by its size. In cases where the audit committee was large, it suffered from the 
problem of free riders and a higher probability of members to be more vulnerable to the pressures and more 
subject to follow other members’ opinion without giving another argument. As a result, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and board audit committee size has significant effect on the financial performance of MFIs. 
H06: Board independency has no significant effect on the financial performance of MFIs.  
Independent Director means a director who has no direct or indirect material relationship with the company other 
than membership on the board. The regression result of the study depicts that outside directors has a positive 
coefficient (0.4082796 and 0.3615147 as performance is measured by ROE and OSS) showing that the more 
proportion of outside directors the higher the financial performance of MFIs. This implies that the monitoring 
and supervising of the board is improved when they are not associated with MFIs as employee or have no share 
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from MFIs as conflict of interest is minimized since they are not the full member of management.  
The result of the study is in line with the prior finding that found there is a positive relationship between 
MFIs’ financial performance and outside directors. Those studies concluded that with their knowledge and 
experiences, outside directors can enhance firm’s performance, as well as protect shareholders’ interest through 
effective decision making (Valentina, 2005; Sharon, 2006; Bassem, 2009; Al-Sahafi et al., 2015). However, the 
finding of the study contradicts the conclusion of Mori & Olomi (2012) that it does not matter whether the 
members of MFI boards are either externally or internally (employees and affiliates) sourced. Agency theory is 
highly concerned about board independence and the balance between executive and non-executive directors on 
the board. The theory recommends that the board of directors is expected to be made up of more non-executive 
directors (NEDs) for effective control since this reduces conflict of interest and ensures a board’s independence 
in monitoring and passing fair and unbiased judgment on management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected and outside directors has significant effect on the financial 
performance MFIs. 
 
Control Effect and MFIs Financial Performance 
Under this section the effect of control variables on the financial performance of microfinance institutions was 
discussed. The control variables selected for the study and expected to influence financial performance of MFIs 
are size of MFI, leverage and age of MFIs. In addition to what has been discussed above, the regression result of 
the two models depict the result of the regression analysis between control variables and financial performance 
indicators of sample MFIs which are interpreted below. 
The regression result of the study reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between MFIs age 
and their financial performance. The model coefficient of the two models (0.02099266 and 0.0451513 for ROE 
and OSS respectively) indicate that as microfinance stay in the market for long period of time, their financial 
performance can be improved through time as they learn more about the techniques how service can be provided 
and use them to innovate the methods of providing services to the public. Kipesha (2013) argued that the age of 
microfinance institution has influence to their financing needs; the older institutions are at an advantage of 
acquiring commercial financing as compared to new established Microfinance institutions. The age of 
Microfinance institutions is also associated with low failure rates due to the resources they possess, goodwill 
created in the market over time as well as legitimacy created in the market place. The older Microfinance 
institutions have acquired knowledge and experience about the market, the better operational strategies, 
financing sources, customer needs and have learned ways to overcome competition constraints in the market.  
Regarding leverage, the study found that insignificant negative relationship with financial performance of 
MFIs as measured by ROE and OSS. This implies that leverage has no significant effect on performance of 
microfinance institutions. Katsushi et al. (2011) argued that high leverage stands the risk of long term 
sustainability given heavy reliance on debt; the opportunity to access borrowed funds can be harnessed for 
expansion of MFIs. The empirical evidences made in different countries indicate different findings regarding the 
effect of leverage on firm performance. Weill (2003), who carried out new empirical evidence on a major 
corporate governance issues, the relationship between leverage and corporate performance found mixed evidence 
depending on the country; while significantly negative for firms in Italy, the relationship between leverage and 
corporate performance is significantly positive for firms in France and Germany. On the other hand, Majumdar 
& Chhibber (1999) also tested the relationship between leverage and corporate performance on a sample of 
Indian companies by adopting an accounting measure of profitability, return on net worth, to evaluate 
performance and they observed a significant negative association between leverage and corporate performance. 
But, the study on Japanese firms by Hirotsugu & Hitoshi (2003) found a positive relationship with leverage and 
firm performance. Studies from Microfinance institutions operation around the world have also provided mixed 
evidences on the impact of size and age on firm performance. According to the study by Cull et al. (2007), 
Bogan et al. (2008), and Abayie et al. (2011) reveals that the age of Microfinance institutions have a positive 
effect on their performance in terms of efficiency, sustainability and profitability. The evidences provided by 
Coleman (2007) also were contrary to most of the empirical findings on the impact of age on Microfinance 
performance. The study reported a positive impact between age and default rate in Microfinance institutions. The 
study supported the findings on the ground that as the age increases the institutions expands and reaches more 
poor clients. Empirical evidences have also shown the presence of positive impact on the size of MFIs on firm 
performance measured in different aspects.   
The study made by Ejigu (2007) reported a positive impact of size on the profitability and sustainability of 
MFIs in Ethiopia. This result was in line with results by Coleman (2007) which indicated that firm size has a 
positive impact on yield on gross loan microfinance institutions. Contrary to these findings, Bassem (2008) 
reported a negative relationship between size and Microfinance institution's efficiency. The relationship between 
firm size and age is also of great importance in Microfinance institutions. Due to outreach to the poor focus, 
most of the Microfinance institutions depend much on grants, donations and other forms of subsidies especially 
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at start up phase. As the Microfinance institutions grow in term of their size and experience, they are expected to 
operate more efficiently and sustainable with less dependent on subsidies from donors (Armendariz &Morduch, 
2004).  
 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
Summary and Conclusion 
The findings of the study indicate that all the corporate governance elements did not affect the performance of 
MFIs in the same way.  In order to be consistent with the objective of the research, the study identified variables 
of corporate governance mechanisms such as size of the board, educational qualification of the board, board 
experience in the financial sector, meeting frequency of the board, board audit committee size and independent 
director as independent variables, and MFIs’ size, leverage and MFIs’ age as control variables. The Pairwise 
Correlations and regression analysis was also used to find out whether there is a relationship between the 
variables to be measured (i.e. corporate governance and MFIs financial performance) and also to find out 
whether the relationship is significant or not.   
As financial performance indicators the study used Return on Equity (ROE) and Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS) as dependent variables. The table of descriptive statistics result indicates that the financial 
performance of sample MFIs are 13.48 percent and 129.29 percent as measured by ROE and OSS respectively, 
indicating that the sample MFIs are better in covering their operational costs by using their operational revenues 
than utilizing shareholders’ funds. On the other hand, the descriptive statistics result of board characteristics of 
MFIs are generally characterized by having an average board size of 7, an average of 95.15 percent of the 
directors have college degree and above, 70.38 percent of directors were experienced in the financial sector and 
38.08 percent were member of audit committee.  In addition, the board meets on average 7 times in a year which 
is less than the suggestion by NBE which is 12times for meeting of MFIs per annum. Pairwise correlations 
analysis table of the study depicts that boar size, board educational qualification, meeting frequency, board 
independency are positively associated with ROE.  However, board experience in the financial sector and board 
audit committee Size were negatively correlated with ROE.  From the control variables, MFIs age of sample 
MFIs is also positively correlated with ROE. On the other hand, board size, educational qualification of the 
board, frequency of board meeting and outside directors are positively correlated with OSS. In contrast to this, 
board experience in the financial sector and board audit committee size is negatively associated with OSS. In 
addition, MFIs age is positively correlated with operational self-sufficiency.  
The hypotheses were tested from random-effect GLS regression models. According to the regression result 
of the study, from the explanatory variables board size, board educational qualification, board experience in the 
financial sector, meeting frequency, board independency and MFIs age were found to be significant regressors of 
performance of sample MFIs as measured by ROE; whereas board size, board educational qualification, board 
experience in the financial sectors, board audit committee size and MFIs age were significantly influence 
financial performance measured by OSS. However, the study found statistically insignificant relationship 
between board audit committee size, MFI size and leverage and ROE, and also no significant relationship 
between meeting frequency of the board, board independency and leverage with OSS. 
The study found that there is a positive relationship between the size of the board and educational 
qualification of the board and financial performance of MFIs measured by ROE and OSS. The result indicates 
that the larger board member and high proportion of directors who had college degree or higher have a 
significant positive influence on the financial performance of MFIs. Thrikawala (2013) point out that there must 
be guidance for selecting directors for MFI boards based on their academic and professional qualifications. 
According to previous empirical study qualified board plays a vital role in monitoring and overseeing the 
activities and decision of the firm. This implies that the board with sufficient educational qualification can easily 
understand and interpret different reports prepared by management, which are vital to enhance performance. 
Board experience in the financial sector has negative association with financial performance measured by return 
on equity (ROE) and operational self-sufficiency (OSS). This implies the role of board members with experience 
in the financial sector can be extended to reduce the financial performance and impact for the betterment of 
MFIs’ overall performance. Regarding meeting frequency of the board, it is positively and significantly 
influence on financial performance. Mangena & Tauringana (2008) and other previous studies found that 
frequent and regular board meeting can result in higher in quality of management monitoring which in turn 
impact positively on corporate financial performance. This implies that boards should regularly meet in 
executive session to discuss matters that may be particularly sensitive regarding management which in turn 
improve the financial performance of MFIs. The regression result of the study revealed that board audit 
committee size has statistically significant negative relationship with performance as measured by OSS and 
positive insignificant effect on ROE. This implies that when the number of the board included in the audit 
committee is increase, the financial performance of MFIs goes in reverse direction. Board independency, 
according to the finding of the study has a positive relationship with financial performance of the sample MFIs. 
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This implies that the monitoring and supervising of the board is improved when they are not associated with 
MFIs as employee or have no share from MFIs as conflict of interest is minimized since they are not the full 
member of management.  
To sum up, the results of the study indicated that good corporate governance structure plays an imperative 
role in improving the financial performance of MFIs. This study presented the first evidence on the link between 
governance mechanisms and financial performance in microfinance institutions. Empirical result of the study 
evidenced that the corporate governance mechanism and its effect on financial performance is characterized by 
reasonable board size that reduce overburdening members that improve their monitoring, advising and making 
available better linkage to the external environment that results better financial performance of MFIs. In addition, 
educational qualification of the board, meeting frequency and outside directors influence financial performance 
positively; whereas board experience in the financial sector and board audit committee size influence 
performance negatively. Finally, agency theory offers a general good explanation of the associations between 
corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of the firm. 
 
Recommendations 
The foremost purpose of this study was to examine the effect of corporate governance on the financial 
performance of MFIs operating in Addis Ababa city administration. Both theoretical as well as empirical 
evidence that support and against the findings of the study was reviewed. Based on the findings of the study and 
conclusion arrived, the following recommendations were forwarded to the concerned body. 
First, compare to other sectors, effective governance in the financial sector is more important since the 
sector needs great attention because of its importance in keeping on the track the country’s economy. The main 
reason why financial sector needs greater attention regarding its governance is that they held money from the 
public as deposit that they in turn provide loans to the deficit parties who want to invest in different investment 
area. As a result microfinance institutions need to strengthen the corporate governance principles which guide 
the responsibilities of the board of directors, the chairpersons, CEOs, senior management, board appointed 
committees, auditors, shareholders and regulators.  Because governance is said to be all about effective if it is 
transparent and accountable administration of affairs of an institution by its management while protecting the 
interests of its stakeholders including shareholders, creditors, regulators and the public. More specifically, 
effective governance is needed for MFIs as they are the major economic driving force in developing economy. 
The following points are the some of the major reasons why greater consideration regarding governance of MFIs 
is needed. 
 Their major liabilities are generated from funds raised mainly through deposits from the public, mainly 
from the poor that require greater fiduciary responsibilities on MFIs and its directors since depositors’ 
funds need to be safeguarded.  
 Like other financial institutions, MFIs also serve as intermediaries between savers and investors by 
lending funds they accept as deposit from the public to the investors who need to spend on different area 
of economy.  
 MFI is one of the members of financial institutions; they need to perform their activities in a manner that 
keep public confidence since loss of public trust leads to financial crisis that in turn leads to economic 
crisis.  
Second, good corporate governance in the MFIs plays an important role in improving their financial 
performance, improving transparency, accountability, sustainability, profitability, efficiency, effectiveness, 
responsibility and responsiveness to the changing environments. Effective corporate governance depends on both 
structures and processes of control, and content and specific individuals involved, particularly in the leadership. 
Board of director is the major management organ which plays a critical role in ensuring good governance of 
MFIs to ensure their profitability and sustainability. Therefore, the laws and codes of conduct that have been 
recently designed to guide the conduct of firm regarding corporate governance should be designed and 
implemented in order to oversight the size, composition, qualification and experience of the board member that 
monitor the activity of the management. Third, publication of manual rules of corporate governance and make 
available for information the public needs in order to benefit from the application of rules by the management 
and employees and the various activities of the firm. To do so, NBE needs to set up a unified corporate body 
burden with the responsibility of collecting corporate governance related data and constructing the relevant 
indices to facilitate corporate governance research in Ethiopia. 
Fourth, on the basis of the above, the authors recommend that the approach to microfinance governance be 
broadened by focusing to a greater extent on an MFI’s stakeholders and the decision-making process within the 
MFI. This will likely yield a better insight into the way in which MFIs are really managed. Fifth, educational 
qualification of the board directors improve the MFIs’ profitability and sustainability and since the presence of 
qualified directors on the board plays an indispensable role in performing the boards’ monitoring and supervising 
that in turn improve the financial performance of MFIs. Therefore, MFIs should give great consideration to have 
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board of directors with a college degree or above to obtain benefits from well qualified directors. Sixth, board 
size needs to be large in number, adhering to the minimum requirement of National Bank of Ethiopia which is 
seven, to an optimal level with better educational qualification, since large board size with better educational 
qualification is more effective in monitoring and overseeing the management and help to improve performance. 
Moreover, the larger the number of board of directors the greater is its contribution for performance as revealed 
by this study 
Finally, the size of audit committee should be small so that there would be a smooth communication and a 
simple and transparent decision making process, which contributes in improving their performance. As the result, 
audit should be appropriate in size to provide shareholders with periodic reports on changes affecting the 
shareholders in the company, and held regular meetings with members of the board of directors ensuring that 
their role should be done to share in the responsibility. Because, as this study revealed, large size of an audit 
committee negatively affects performance and may not play its role effectively in mitigating the risk of fraud and 
misrepresentation of the information and improve monitoring and transparency in operations which lead to 
timely and accurate reporting of the loan defaults and poor performance in an MFI. 
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